

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY**

**I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA
TE PAPAIOEA ROHE**

**CRI-2024-031-863
[2026] NZHC 1944**

THE KING

v

DYLAN NEIL JENSEN

Hearing: 6 July 2026

Appearances: B D Vanderkolk and G M Stone for Crown
F D Steedman for Defendant

Judgment: 6 July 2026

SENTENCING REMARKS OF McQUEEN J

[1] Mr Jensen, you appear for sentencing today having pleaded guilty to the charge of murdering Terrance Clough.¹

[2] Before I turn to the sentencing remarks, I want to recognise the profound loss that Mr Clough's family has suffered. Mr Vanderkolk has confirmed they are not present today in the Court, but Mr Clough's brother has provided a very meaningful victim impact statement that I have read. I acknowledge that there is nothing I am able to do or say today, and no sentence that the Court can impose, that can meet this loss of a loved family member.

¹ Crimes Act 1961, ss 167(1)(b) and 172.

[3] I also acknowledge those who are present to support Mr Jensen as he is sentenced. Mr Jensen, I observe how fortunate you are. It is not often that the Court will see a whole line of whānau who are here to help someone in your situation, so I am very happy to see you all in court today.

[4] Mr Jensen, now I am going to address you.

The offending

[5] I begin by describing the offending on which you are to be sentenced from a summary of facts that you have accepted. I appreciate that these facts are well-known to you and to many people in the Court, but the public nature of sentencing requires that I set out the basis on which you are being sentenced.

[6] On 19 September 2024, you and the deceased, Terrance Clough, were living at a boarding house in Levin, along with others.

[7] On the evening of 19 September, you and Mr Clough were in a communal area of the boarding house watching television. At about 10.00 pm, you went back to your room and armed yourself with a hunting knife, tying it around your waist in a sheath, before returning to the communal area. Shortly after that, Mr Clough went outside for a cigarette. He then returned to the communal area. You were sitting next to each other on the couch.

[8] Soon after, without provocation, you confronted Mr Clough, saying “And what, and what”. You then used the knife from the sheath to stab him three times—being once each in his chest, arm and torso. You later described yourself plunging your knife up to its hilt into his chest. Mr Clough received significant injuries as a result of being stabbed, and he died at the scene.

[9] You then left the address and threw the knife away. You made your way towards a nearby house where a relative lived but instead you then walked around the block twice and saw emergency services before deciding to turn yourself in to Police.

[10] In explanation, you told Police that there had been ongoing issues between you and Mr Clough.

[11] In addition to the summary of facts, with the agreement of counsel, nine formal witness statements have been provided to the Court to provide further context to the offending. These statements confirm that there had been arguments and tension between you and Mr Clough, before the day you killed him. Some of the witnesses say it was clear you did not like each other. A statement from a friend of yours says you did not feel accepted at the house and that you had been picked on by another resident, (who was likely Mr Clough). You told your friend that you felt something bad was going to happen at the house.

Other background

[12] I now outline some relevant background matters.

[13] Mr Jensen, you are 32 years' old. You are of Ngāti Toa and Ngāti Kahungunu descent although you do not identify significantly with your Māori heritage. Your parents separated when you were 12 or 13 years old. But, as I have already noted, you have the strong and ongoing support of each of your parents and wider family members. I acknowledge the letters that have been provided to the Court by them. Despite having athletic and other talents, you had a difficult time at school, struggling to form relationships with your peer group and being bullied. Mental health difficulties began to manifest themselves, along with increasing dependence on drugs, particularly alcohol and cannabis. At 15 years' old, you stabbed yourself, puncturing a lung, in response to the end of a relationship. Nonetheless, for some years, you were able to maintain steady employment in various low-level jobs. You spent time in the bush and took up long-distance running. You have a short history of violence offending when you were 22 years' old. The most serious offence you committed was assault with intent to injure, for which you received a sentence of community detention. You did not come to notice again until the present offending. You acknowledge using methamphetamine on a regular basis for some time, although you say this has stopped in recent years.

[14] Your mental health issues were apparent at the time of the Police interview following your arrest (and, I acknowledge, for a much longer period to members of your family and others who know you).

[15] In terms of court process, this led to the obtaining of reports under s 38(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003. Following the receipts of reports from Professor Every-Palmer (a consultant forensic psychiatrist),² and Ms Kirsty Williams (a clinical psychologist),³ the Court made a finding on 28 February 2025 that you were fit to stand trial.

[16] A further report from Professor Every-Palmer concluded that “on balance, Mr Jensen has a defence of insanity available to him”.⁴ Your counsel, Mr Steedman, then commissioned a report from Dr Justin Barry-Walsh.⁵ Dr Barry-Walsh’s conclusions were similar to those of Professor Every-Palmer, including that a defence of insanity was available to you, on balance, as a result of your inability to reason as to the moral wrongfulness of your actions. Both Professor Every-Palmer and Dr Barry-Walsh concluded that you suffer from a psychotic illness, most likely schizophrenia.

[17] Professor Every-Palmer observed that your medical records “testify to a long history of mental health difficulties and significant associated distress and impairment of functioning”. Both Professor Every Palmer and Dr Barry-Walsh set out relevant history in their reports, running from 2020, which it is not necessary for me to repeat here.

[18] Mr Steedman has acted as your counsel from the time of your arrest. He has advised the Court of your firm and consistent position over time that you wished to enter a guilty plea to the charge of murder and refused to advance a defence of insanity. You disagreed with the expert assessments that you did not appreciate the moral wrongfulness of your actions in killing Mr Clough. You have not accepted that you were mentally disordered or suffering from a psychotic illness and have made these

² Dated 20 February 2025.

³ Dated 24 February 2025.

⁴ Dated 12 August 2025.

⁵ Dated 1 November 2025.

views clear to the psychiatrists you have seen. Rather your position was that you knew what you were doing and what the consequences were likely to be. You have expressed remorse at Mr Clough's death, recognising the impact of it on Mr Clough's family and friends, and Mr Steedman reiterated that on your behalf this morning.

[19] Ultimately, in December 2025, Mr Steedman took your written instructions to arrange for the entry of a guilty plea, and you duly pleaded guilty to the charge of murdering Mr Clough. A pre-sentence report was prepared.

[20] Your sentencing was scheduled for 27 February 2026. I adjourned that hearing to enable further information to be obtained in relation to your mental illness and the application of the manifest injustice exception to life imprisonment under s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002, given the Supreme Court decision in *Van Hemert v R*.⁶ As there was no expert information before the Court as to the appropriate treatment or sentence for you, I directed a further report be obtained.⁷ Professor Every-Palmer duly prepared another report.⁸

[21] Professor Every-Palmer reaffirmed her previous conclusion that you have a serious mental illness, likely schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. She does not consider your diagnosis to be a drug-induced psychosis. In her opinion, you were labouring under a disease of the mind (psychosis) at the time of the offending. Professor Every-Palmer considers that your delusional beliefs and abnormal perceptions created an environment in which you felt you were being harassed and persecuted by others and that your safety was in jeopardy.

[22] Professor Every-Palmer assessed your risk of violent reoffending as moderate, but with high risk of potential harm if such offending does occur. The risk is highly contextual. You are at a much higher risk of offending when you are psychotic and the chance of you becoming psychotic again has been assessed as relatively high. This is

⁶ *Van Hemert v R* [2023] NZSC 116, [2023] 1 NZLR 412. See also *R v Jensen* HC Palmerston North CRI-2024-031-863, 2 March 2026 (Minute of McQueen J).

⁷ Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 38(1)(c) and (d). Counsel also agreed that nine formal witness statements (with certain redactions) would be provided to the report writer and the Court. Counsel further agreed that the Police interview with Mr Jensen may be provided to the report writer. Due to an administrative oversight, this did not occur.

⁸ Dated 28 May 2026.

because the working diagnosis usually presents as chronic and relapsing illnesses, and there are identifiable destabilisers such as stress, unstable living situations, limited social supports, difficult interpersonal dynamics and substance use.

[23] Professor Every-Palmer recommends that your abnormal mental state at the time of the offending be taken into account as a significant mitigating factor in terms of sentencing. She does not however consider it would be unjust to impose a life sentence for this very serious offending. She says your culpability is diminished because of your mental health difficulties and should be taken into account in setting a minimum period of imprisonment.

[24] As you have heard, Mr Steedman, and Mr Vanderkolk and Mr Stone for the Crown, have provided further helpful submissions about the appropriate sentence for you, addressing the manifest injustice exception to life imprisonment under s 102.

Approach to sentencing

[25] Before considering the application of s 102, I briefly note the overall approach I must take in sentencing you for your offending. I must apply the Sentencing Act 2002.⁹ The main purposes of sentencing you are to hold you accountable for the harm you have caused by your offending; to promote in you a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of that harm; to denounce and deter such conduct; to protect the community from you; and to assist you in your rehabilitation and reintegration.¹⁰ The particularly relevant principles under the Sentencing Act that I must consider are the gravity of your offending and your degree of culpability, the seriousness of the offence itself, and the general need to achieve consistency with other sentences.¹¹

Whether a sentence of life imprisonment is appropriate

[26] The usual sentence for murder is one of life imprisonment. Section 102 of the Sentencing Act contains a strong presumption that life imprisonment should be

⁹ I note that the version of Sentencing Act 2002 as of 1 March 2024 is applicable in this case given the offending occurred prior to the recent amendments to that Act in the Sentencing (Reform) Amendment Act 2025.

¹⁰ Sentencing Act, s 7(a), (b) and (e)–(h).

¹¹ Section 8(a), (b) and (e).

imposed.¹² This reflects the sanctity of human life. The presumption may only be displaced if, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust.¹³ That assessment, involving the weighing together of both elements referred to in s 102(1), is made having regard to the principles and purposes of sentencing.¹⁴ And in this context, “manifestly” means the injustice in imposing life imprisonment must be clear.¹⁵

[27] It is the correct application of s 102 in your circumstances, Mr Jensen, that led to the adjournment of your sentencing and is the key issue to address today.

[28] Initial submissions from counsel focused on the circumstances of the offending and of you as the offender not being exceptional, and thus that the usual categories of offending where life imprisonment has been considered manifestly unjust are inapplicable here.¹⁶ I have now received additional and helpful submissions about the application of the Supreme Court decision in *Van Hemert*. In that case, the Supreme Court relevantly emphasised the significance of both mental impairment and community protection in the s 102 assessment.¹⁷

[29] For the Crown, Mr Vanderkolk submits that the decision in *Van Hemert v R* is distinguishable. In that case, it was common ground between the Crown and defence counsel that “but for” Mr Van Hemert’s severe mental impairment on the night of the murder, the victim would not have been murdered. The Crown says that is not the case here, although it accepts your mental impairment contributed to your offending. Rather, Mr Vanderkolk says your mental impairment was longstanding, less acute, and there is less direct evidence that it was operative to the extent the offending is inextricably linked to the mental illness. Mr Vanderkolk highlights the witness statements, now available to the Court, that establish there were ongoing issues

¹² Section 102.

¹³ Section 102(1).

¹⁴ *R v Van Hemert*, above n 6, at [62].

¹⁵ At [62], citing *R v Rapira* [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA) at [121].

¹⁶ Such as youth, limited involvement in the offending, “mercy killings” and a “battered defendant”. Mr Steedman referred me to three Court of Appeal decisions that offer some guidance, being *R v Rapira*, above n 15; *R v Wihongi* [2011] NZCA 592; and *R v Mayes* [2004] 1 NZLR 71 (CA).

¹⁷ *R v Van Hemert*, above n 6, at [80]–[83].

between you and Mr Clough in the days leading to the murder. Mr Vanderkolk submits that Mr Clough wanted you gone from the address, and you felt threatened.

[30] The Crown says that you were able to, and did, form murderous intent on the day of the murder. You described how you had had enough of Mr Clough. You described how, after you had been sitting with Mr Clough watching TV, that you went to your cabin, picked up your knife, put it around your waist and returned to Mr Clough. You took off your jersey, turned your hat backwards, picked up the knife and started stabbing him. You described plunging the knife into the deceased until you “felt his chest wall”, and it “went right up to the handle”.

[31] As already mentioned, the psychiatric evidence in relation to you, Mr Jensen, establishes that a defence of insanity was, on balance, available, but you refused to advance it. Mr Steedman explains that the written instructions you gave to him were completely incompatible with an insanity defence, including your acknowledgement of the anger you felt at the time you killed Mr Clough, as recorded in some of the reports. Nonetheless, Mr Steedman submits that the link between your psychosis and your actions in killing Mr Clough are compelling and obvious.

[32] The Crown submits that the issue as to whether you were insane would have been contested at trial, and sentencing must proceed on the basis that you were not insane at the time of the offence. Mr Steedman acknowledges that the Crown has never accepted an insanity defence was appropriate, and had the case progressed to trial, the extent to which your psychoses governed your actions would have been an issue for the jury to resolve. Mr Steedman also records his view that he would not have been able to call you to give evidence, and he accepts that had an insanity defence been advanced it is possible it may have been countered successfully by the eyewitness evidence available to the Crown. You have acknowledged to Mr Steedman that the witness statements are factually correct. The conflict between you and Mr Clough was noticeable and ongoing. You also have a history of violent offending. Mr Steedman therefore retains some doubt whether the operative extent of the mental impairment

on the offending would call for a response going beyond adjustment of the minimum period of imprisonment.¹⁸

[33] Despite these matters, Mr Steedman submits that the Court may put the causation (or “but for”) issue to one side in determining whether it would be manifestly unjust for the presumption of life imprisonment to apply to you. The reason for this is that he accepts that public safety considerations mean that the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment would not be manifestly unjust—a submission also made by the Crown.

[34] Thus, the Crown and Mr Steedman both say that the Court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment. I agree this is the right outcome (as I will go on to explain further) and I also accept Mr Steedman’s submission that it is unnecessary to determine whether, “but for” your abnormal mental state of mind at the time of the attack on Mr Clough, that would have occurred.

[35] In reaching this view, I am mindful that this case is not one where no defence of insanity was available, as was the position in *Van Hemert*. While the Supreme Court observed that had such a defence been available for Mr Van Hemert, “there would have been no need to sentence at all”,¹⁹ the present case reveals a likely different situation—the possibility of such a defence but a defendant unwilling to pursue it. In Dr Every-Palmer’s most recent report, she records your longstanding anosognosia (lack of insight) and stigmatised attitudes to mental illness. This includes you not wanting to ever take any psychiatric medication or receive psychiatric care. In my view, this context also tempers the weight to be placed on your expressions of remorse.

[36] Bearing in mind the consistent psychiatric evidence available to me from Professor Every-Palmer and Dr Barry-Walsh as to your abnormal mental state at the

¹⁸ See *R v Van Hemert*, above n 6, at [82]. While the Supreme Court concluded Mr Van Hemert lacked an inherent propensity for violence and the offending would not have occurred but for the onset of an uncontrollable psychotic episode, the Court emphasised his targeting of a complete stranger and his lack of remorse on return to his baseline mood, suggesting a heightened need for public protection. There has been no suggestion by counsel that Mr Jensen’s situation is comparable to the rare cases where the High Court has applied s 102 to an offender whose offending was influenced by a serious mental impairment and who still posed a level of risk to public safety, see the Supreme Court’s discussion at [91]–[92].

¹⁹ At [82].

time of offending, and despite the eye witness accounts and your own acknowledgements, I am satisfied that my decision that there is no manifest injustice in imposing a life sentence is more firmly grounded in the view I have formed about the sentencing purpose relating to the protection of the public.

[37] I therefore now turn to the issue of public safety.

[38] I have already mentioned Professor Every-Palmer's findings as to your moderate risk of violent reoffending but with a high risk of potential harm if offending occurs. You present with a number of well-established historical and clinical risk factors associated with future violence. Your past records note that you expressed homicidal ideation in the context of psychotic symptoms a year before the murder of Mr Clough.

[39] The pre-sentence report-writer also assesses you as a high risk of harm to the community and a moderate risk of reoffending. You are assessed to pose a significant risk to any person that is known to you, or otherwise, and that if you form an opinion this person is threatening you or stealing from you, it would result in an explosive violent reaction.

[40] Mr Vanderkolk submits there are a number of clearly identifiable risk factors. Your history of mental illness is significant, and there is a concerning pattern of homicidal ideation. It is likely, if you were to become unwell, that you would fail to recognise that you are unwell and therefore would not obtain the treatment you require. This poses a genuine risk of harm to the community. Mr Vanderkolk says that in the absence of the oversight of life recall to prison and extended-release conditions, you will continue to pose an ongoing safety risk to the community.

[41] Mr Steedman acknowledges that you lack the self-awareness to keep yourself and others safe in the community. This has been reflected in your negative reaction to your family's past attempts to help you. Mr Steedman notes Professor Every-Palmer's concerns about your future without ongoing monitoring, external structure, and treatment oversight, while nonetheless recognising the significant improvement in your psychiatric symptoms during your 18 months or so on remand in a structured,

supervised and substance-free custodial environment.²⁰ Mr Steedman advises that you are increasing your contact with your family and records the greater optimism your parents now hold about your future. Mr Steedman submits accordingly that a sentence of life imprisonment is the sentence best suited to provide you with the support you need and to protect the community.²¹

[42] This is reinforced by Professor Every-Palmer's view that special conditions imposed by a future parole board are likely valuable in reducing the risk of future offending. These might include mandated health follow-up and supported accommodation with probation oversight.

[43] I am satisfied that a sentence of life imprisonment is necessary for you, Mr Jensen, in the interests of public safety. It is not clearly unjust that extended parole eligibility and release conditions, and potential for recall, apply to you. Such ongoing monitoring and oversight provided by the Parole Board will best manage your risk to public safety and outweigh the impairment to your life post-release.

Minimum period of imprisonment

[44] This is not, however, the end of the sentencing exercise. Where the Court imposes a sentence of life imprisonment on a charge of murder, it must also specify the minimum period of imprisonment that the offender must serve before being eligible to apply for parole.²² This is called an MPI. The MPI must be a minimum non-parole period of at least 10 years and is required to reflect particular sentencing

²⁰ Professor Every-Palmer records "In the future, a convergence of deteriorating psychotic or mood symptoms (particularly if these involved persecutory delusions), relapse into substance use, and unstable accommodation, particularly through shared supported accommodation such as he previously experienced at Legacy Housing, would represent a high-risk scenario for violent offending which could involve serious harm or loss of life to someone known to Mr Jensen who he believes is persecuting him. By contrast, his significant improvement during the last 18 months in a structured, supervised, and substance-free custodial setting suggests that ongoing monitoring, external structure, and treatment oversight are likely to be strongly risk mitigating. Continued psychiatric monitoring both in prison and within the community is an important protective factor. Additional risk reduction strategies would include engagement in prison-based alcohol and drug treatment programmes, violence prevention work, and individual psychological intervention aimed at improving insight, relapse recognition, emotional regulation, and offence understanding."

²¹ Mr Steedman expresses his regret at having to adopt this position but believes that not doing so would have been irresponsible. I acknowledge the challenges faced by Mr Steedman as defence counsel in the circumstances of this case and appreciate his thoughtful approach to the issues.

²² Section 103(1).

purposes—the need to hold you accountable for the harm done to Mr Clough, his family and the community, to denounce your conduct, to deter other persons from committing similar offences and to protect the community.²³

[45] In certain cases, an MPI that is longer than 10 years is necessary to satisfy one or more of these purposes. Under s 104 of the Sentencing Act the Court must impose an MPI of at least 17 years in cases which involve one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in s 104, unless it would be manifestly unjust to do so.

[46] Both Mr Vanderkolk and Mr Steedman submit this is not a case where s 104 applies. I agree. Your attack on Mr Clough, and subsequent actions, do not reach that high threshold to set an MPI of 17 years. Accordingly, your MPI should be set in accordance with s 103 of the Sentencing Act.

What MPI would be appropriate under s 103?

[47] In determining what MPI is appropriate under s 103, I must consider comparable cases and what MPI was imposed in those. I must set a starting point MPI in your case before considering what adjustments need to be made to that starting point to take account of your personal circumstances.

[48] The Crown says that an overall starting point MPI of 11 years is appropriate. Mr Vanderkolk refers me to three comparable cases.²⁴ Mr Steedman accepts on your behalf that the appropriate notional starting point is in the vicinity of 11 years.

[49] As mentioned, I must consider other similar cases to ensure that there is a consistent approach to other cases with similar features. I have considered the cases to which counsel have referred. I note two of those in particular.

[50] In *R v Ray*, the deceased and the defendant had been drinking together all day at the defendant's address. Earlier in the day they got into a serious fight in which the defendant was knocked out and his leg was broken. Later, when they were sitting

²³ Sentencing Act, s 103(2). See *Malik v R* [2015] NZCA 597 at [28].

²⁴ *R v Fahey* [2015] NZHC 78; *Wheeler v R* [2023] NZCA 563; and *R v Ray* [2014] NZHC 599. I have also found the case of *R v Millar* HC Auckland CRI-2010-090-5044, 21 June 2011 to be of some assistance.

inside the house for dinner, the defendant took a long knife from the kitchen and stabbed the deceased through the neck up to the hilt. The Court set the notional starting point for the offending at 12 years. The stabbing in *Ray* might be considered to be more aggravating than in the present case, but not to a significant extent given your acknowledgement, Mr Jensen, of stabbing Mr Clough in his chest up to the hilt of your knife.

[51] In *R v Millar*, the defendant and the deceased were socialising with two friends. Alcohol was involved. At some point during the evening, something was said that annoyed the defendant, who got up, went to the kitchen, and took a knife back to the room where the others were sitting. Someone in the room challenged him as to why he had the knife, leading to a small scuffle between the defendant and the deceased. Following that, and without warning, the defendant stabbed the deceased in the neck, causing an injury from which the deceased died at the scene. The Judge considered that the appropriate starting point was a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years, having regard to the gratuitous nature of the violence, and the premeditation involved.

[52] As is apparent from the descriptions I have just given, these are both cases of premeditated murders in response to a real or perceived slight involving a level of gratuitous violence wholly out of proportion to what had occurred, within a residential environment.

[53] These cases confirm that in factual contexts not dissimilar to the present, a starting point of around 11 years is appropriate. On that basis, I therefore conclude that the appropriate starting point for the minimum period of imprisonment in your case, Mr Jensen, is 11 years.

Personal aggravating and mitigating factors

[54] I now turn to consider your personal circumstances that may impact on the minimum term of imprisonment.

[55] You have eight previous criminal convictions, with the most recent conviction being in 2016, including convictions for violence. The most serious are the two charges you faced for common assault (domestic relationship) and assaults with intent

to injure in 2015. You have not previously served a custodial sentence but have served community-based sentences in relation to that prior offending. The Crown does not seek an uplift based on these prior convictions and I agree this is appropriate.

[56] The Crown accepts some credit for a guilty plea is appropriate. It is well established that pleas for murder often attract allowances between one and two years, although your end sentence cannot be reduced below a 10-year MPI level. As Mr Vanderkolk acknowledges, a plea allowance of one year could reduce the end MPI to 10 years.

[57] It is also not in dispute that personal allowances are available to you, Mr Jensen.

[58] Most significantly, the causative link between your mental illness and the offending is strongly supported by the psychiatric reports available to me—I do not propose to repeat material I have already discussed. I am satisfied that such a causative link is established. Mr Steedman has referred me to some caselaw relevant to this point, but I do not find it necessary to discuss that in any detail, in the circumstances.²⁵

[59] I am satisfied that a reduction to acknowledge your guilty plea of one year is appropriate. This results in a reduction in your MPI to 10 years' imprisonment.

[60] For completeness, I record that I would have allowed a further reduction for the effect of your mental health issues on your culpability, but in the circumstances, there is no need to quantify such a reduction beyond indicating my view that it would properly amount to at least one year.

[61] Finally, I note Professor Every-Palmer's recommendation that her report be made available to the prison forensic team. If this has not yet occurred, I direct that the registry make it available.

²⁵ *R v Morris* [2012] NZHC 616; *R v Brackenridge* [2019] NZHC 1627; and *R v Douthett* [2019] NZHC 2214.

Sentence

[62] Mr Jensen, please stand.

[63] On the charge of murder, you are sentenced to life imprisonment. You must serve a minimum term of 10 years' imprisonment before being eligible to apply for parole.

[64] You may stand down.

McQueen J

Solicitors:
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