High Court Judgments of Public Interest

Stormy Ryder sentenced to manslaughter of her 19-month-old, whose direct cause of death was complications from starvation and dehydration. Ms Ryder pleaded guilty to the charge at the beginning of her jury trial after acceptance of a sentence indication in April 2026. After rejecting a request by the defence to revisit the starting point as a result of matters raised in a psychological report, a sentence of three years and five months’ imprisonment was imposed. This sentence comprised of a starting point of six years and three months’ imprisonment and several personal mitigating factors, including 25 per cent for personal background and addiction issues; five per cent for remorse; five per cent for prospects of rehabilitation; and 10 per cent for her guilty plea.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s 7(3) of the Gangs Act 2024, which provides that gang insignia unlawfully displayed in a public place is forfeited to the Crown upon a guilty plea or conviction and may thereafter be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as directed by the court. Mr Gray-Gill pleaded guilty to displaying Black Power gang insignia in a public place. Following conviction and discharge, the District Court recorded that the insignia was forfeited to the Crown but directed that it was not to be destroyed, and had earlier indicated that it could be returned to Mr Gray-Gill. The Solicitor-General appealed, arguing that once forfeited, the insignia could not lawfully be returned and that a direction merely prohibiting destruction was not available under s 7(3)(b).

Held: Appeal allowed. Consistent with the Court's reasoning in Solicitor-General v Leef, forfeiture under s 7(3)(a) is automatic, absolute, and irreversible. Once gang insignia is forfeited to the Crown, it cannot be returned to the defendant. Section 7(3)(b) requires the court to direct either destruction or another lawful form of disposal, but a direction that the insignia simply "not be destroyed" is not contemplated by the statutory scheme. The District Court's directions were quashed, except for the forfeiture order, and the matter was remitted to the District Court to determine the police application for destruction or another lawful form of disposal, excluding return of the insignia to Mr Gray-Gill.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s 7(3) of the Gangs Act 2024, which provides that gang insignia displayed unlawfully in a public place is forfeited to the Crown upon a guilty plea or conviction and may thereafter be "destroyed or otherwise disposed of' as directed by the court. The respondent, Mr Leef, a patched member of the Mongrel Mob, pleaded guilty to displaying gang insignia in a public place. Following conviction, his gang patch was forfeited to the Crown. The District Court subsequently directed that the patch be returned to Mr Leef after he undertook not to wear it again in public, holding that the phrase "otherwise disposed of' in s 7(3)(b) was broad enough to encompass return of the patch to its former owner. The Solicitor-General appealed, contending that, after forfeiture under s 7(3)(a), the statutory power to direct destruction or other disposal (under s 7(3)(b) does not include returning the forfeited item to the person from whom it was seized.

Held: appeal allowed. Applying orthodox principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held that forfeiture to the Crown under s 7(3)(a) is absolute and irretrievable. Once forfeited, the insignia remains in the Crown possession pending an application to the court for its destruction or other permanent disposal. The phrase "otherwise disposed of' does not extend to returning the insignia to the defendant, as such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the forfeiture and the statutory scheme as a whole. The Court also held that the effect of the subsection is to override the right to personal property. Similarly, the Court held that it is not possible to find a tenable meaning that is consistent, or less inconsistent, with the rights affirmed in NZBORA. Accordingly, the Court concluded that s 7(3) does not permit the return of forfeited gang insignia to a defendant. The matter was remitted to the District Court for an order directing destruction of the insignia or another lawful form of disposal, excluding its return to Mr Leef.

Defendant sentenced after pleading guilty to manslaughter and conspiring to pervert the course of justice. At a tangi, the defendant punched the victim in the head once, then pursued him. He punched him once more and stomped on his head twice. The victim subsequently died from injuries caused by one of the two punches.

Held: Starting point of eight years for manslaughter charge, uplifted by nine months for conspiring to pervert the course of justice for overall starting point of eight years nine months' imprisonment. End sentence of seven years' imprisonment after reductions for guilty plea and youth. Minimum period of imprisonment of half the total sentence imposed.  

Cumulative sentence of six years’ imprisonment imposed for three charges of rape, one charge of attempted sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection and one charge of assault on a person in a family relationship (Crimes Act 1961, ss 128(1)(a), 128B, 129 and 194A). Sentence reflected a significant totality adjustment from an end sentence of 11 years and three months to reflect the sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment that the offender was already serving for unrelated sexual offending. This led to a total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment. No minimum period of imprisonment was imposed and nor was preventive detention, in light of the offender’s lack of rehabilitation opportunities to date and the option for an extended supervision order at the end of an already lengthy finite sentence.

Sentencing for two charges of drugged driving causing injury and one of drugged driving causing death.

Held:

1. Starting point of 5.5 years warranted in light of aggravating features which included high THC concentration paired with alcohol, poor driving over a considerable period, known poor condition of vehicle, licence suspended at the time, on bail for driving while suspended at the time.

2. No adjustment for relevant but somewhat dated previous offending.

3. 10 per cent reduction for remorse and limited rehabilitation prospects.

4. 20 per cent reduction for guilty plea following "on the record" offer to plead to charge eventually filed by amendment.

5. Four-month reduction for 10 months spent on EM bail.

6. No reparation order made - no prospect of it being paid.

7. Outstanding fines remitted in light of prison sentence imposed.

8 .Sentences for three charges to be served concurrently. End sentence 3.5 years. Disqualification from driving for 4 years.

Sentencing for manslaughter, assault with intent to injure and assault on a person in a family relationship. Mr Ali killed his nine-and-a-half- month-old baby with a single blow to the abdomen, consistent with a punch, kick or stomp after a loss of temper. Was previously violent against partner.

Held: starting point of 9 years' imprisonment for manslaughter. Aggravating factors in Taueki of extreme violence, serious injury, vulnerability and breach of trust. Uplift of 10 months' for offending against partner. Discounts for youth, background, guilty plea, efforts at rehabilitation and remorse. Five-month discount for time spent on EM bail. End sentence of six years' imprisonment. On the charge of assault with intent to injure and assault on a person in a family relationship, seven months imprisonment. On the charge of assault on a person in a family relationship, three months imprisonment. All sentences to be served concurrently.

Sentencing for murder and other offences committed during escape immediately afterwards.

Held:

1. sentence of life imprisonment for murder (not manifestly unjust)
2. 17-year minimum period of imprisonment imposed because of the highly callous nature of the offending (s 104, Sentencing Act 2002), which callousness was primarily demonstrated by defendant's post-killing conduct.
3. imposition of the 17-year minimum period not manifestly unjust given the notional minimum period of imprisonment that would have been appropriate independent of s 104 would approximate 17 years (with several aggravating factors).
4. sentenced to a concurrent term of five years' imprisonment for arson
5. sentenced to a concurrent term of two years' imprisonment for converting two vehicles
6. sentenced to a concurrent term of one months' imprisonment for dangerous driving
7. order made disqualifying from driving for 12 months for dangerous driving
8. order made disqualifying from driving for 6 months for failing to stop while driving dangerously (cumulative on the 12 months).

Sentencing of three defendants for sexual violation by rape. Mr B and Mr O convicted of one charge of rape as principal and two charges of rape as party. Mr S convicted of rape as principal. Defendants applied for permanent name suppression.

Held: Starting point 13 years' imprisonment for Mr B and Mr O. Aggravating factors include premeditation, victim vulnerability, harm to the victim, scale, and presence of multiple offenders. Starting point of 11 years' imprisonment for Mr S. Aggravating factors include knowledge of victim's vulnerability, harm to the victim and presence of multiple offenders. Twenty per cent discount applied to each defendant to recognise their youth, otherwise good character, and prospect of rehabilitation. No minimum period of imprisonment.

End sentences for Mr B and Mr O of 10 years, five months' imprisonment. End sentence for Mr S of eight years, 10 months' imprisonment.

Application for permanent name suppression declined. Accepted that the defendants meet the threshold of extreme hardship. However, the public interest favoured an exercise of discretion that allowed publication.

Successful judicial review. Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs) challenged Royal Commission into Abuse in Care’s standalone case study into JW faith which formed part of 2024 final report. JWs argued case study breached freedom of religion under NZ Bill of Rights Act (BORA), breached right to natural justice and outside scope of terms of reference. Held, case study did not breach BORA. Commission entitled to investigate practices likely to harm vulnerable members. No breach of natural justice. But case study unlawful as it went beyond examination of abuse “in care” and focused primarily on harmful practices outside care context. HC declared case study unlawful as it exceeded terms of reference.

Sentencing for murder and strangulation. Mr Leona stabbed the deceased approximately 20 times with a knife at the back of a bus. Mr Leona then went to a family friend's address, breaking into the home and strangling the victim.

Held: sentenced to life imprisonment. Starting minimum period of imprisonment of 14 years. Aggravating factors of use of a weapon, brutality, vulnerability and to some degree the harm suffered by witnesses and family. Brutality, cruelty, and callousness engaged under s 104. However, it would be manifestly unjust to impose an MPI of 17 years' imprisonment. Mr Leona was suffering from a disease of the mind at the time of his offending, although this was linked to his consumption of methamphetamine. Uplift of eight months' for strangulation charge. Mitigating factors of guilty plea, remorse, background and addiction, and interests of Mr Leona's children. End sentence of life imprisonment with MPI of 12 years'.

Sentencing for one historical charge of rape. The defendant was already serving a sentence of preventive
detention for extensive sexual offending, and life imprisonment for murder. The Court considered whether
imposing a further finite sentence, which would extend the parole eligibility date, would be consistent with the
totality principle.

HELD: The appropriate sentence was 10 years of imprisonment.

Sentence of life imprisonment with minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 17 years imposed for charge of murder (Crimes Act 1961, s 168). Defendant, M, entered victim's sleep-out with co-defendant, L, to rob O of methamphetamine. M presented firearm and threatened O. O shot in head. Jury found discharge of firearm intentional; M guilty of murder. L convicted of manslaughter ([2025] NZHC 3270).

Held, life sentence not manifestly unjust (Sentencing Act, s 102).

Held, s 104(1A)(c) and (d) engaged. Murder committed in O's dwelling and in commission of serious offence. 17 year MPI required unless manifestly unjust.

Held, MPI of 14 years appropriate if not for s 104. Offending similar to Clarke [2021] NZCA 151; small discount appropriate for youth and effect of undiagnosed auditory processing disorder.

Held, not satisfied MPI of 17 years manifestly unjust.

Application for judicial review. The applicants submitted the policy documents the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation have established in response to the relevant statutory duties do not comply with the requirement to avoid prejudicing the country's reputation and are to that extent unlawful. The Court found the policy documents did not identify with sufficient clarity the standards and procedures the respondent would comply with, in a way that enabled consistent application and review.

HELD: the application for judicial review was granted. The Court made the following declaration that:

(a) part nine of the statement of investment policies, standards, and procedures; and

(b) the sustainable investment framework

do not comply with the requirements of ss 58(2)(c) and 61 (d) of the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 and are unreasonable and unlawful.

Sentencing on the charge of murder. 

Result: sentenced to life imprisonment with an MPI of 17 and a half years. Firearms Prohibition Order made under S 39A of the Arms Act 1987 and reparation ordered of $8,271 to the deceased's family members. 

Appeal against conviction and sentence following judge-alone trial on a charge of failing to exercise due diligence as an officer of Ports of Auckland Ltd (POAL) giving rise to a risk of serious injury or death under ss 44 and 48(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA) – in particular, failing to:

(a) take reasonable steps to ensure that there was a clearly documented, effectively implemented, and appropriate exclusion zone around operating cranes; and
(b) take reasonable steps to verify the provisions of the relevant resources and processes specified.

The charge followed the death of a worker at the Port of Auckland when a shipping container fell on him as he was lashing containers on board the MV Constantinos. The appellant was at the time the CEO of POAL and subject to a duty to exercise due diligence to ensure POAL as a “person conducting a business or undertaking” (PCBU) complied with its separate duties under HSWA. The appellant was sentenced to a fine of $130,000 and ordered to pay costs of $60,000 under s 152 of the HSWA.

Grounds of appeal against conviction included:

(1) the prosecution’s mistaken reliance on Australian cases considering repealed statutes with a reverse onus on an officer;
(2) the prosecution’s lead expert relying on a paper-based review rather than undertaking interviews with staff and a thorough investigation;
(3) focusing on an alleged need to develop best-practice systems, and a CEO having “ultimate responsibility” for “systems leadership”, concepts and obligations which are not referenced in s 44 of HSWA, and thereby making the appellant a proxy for POAL and its separate failings.

Counsel for the appellant identified a number of claimed errors made by the trial Judge and submitted they compounded on one another which led him to ignore relevant evidence, dismiss defence witnesses and overlook a lack of crucial evidence, essentially overlooking s 44(2) of HSWA.

HELD: For the reasons given, there was no miscarriage of justice and the conviction appeal is dismissed. In relation to the sentence appeal, the Judge did not err in law by using the culpability factors from Stumpmaster. The mandatory s 151 factors in HSWA apply to convictions under s 48 irrespective of the duty breached – but the application of s 151 depends on the breach of duty in issue. While the starting point of $140,000 may have been stern and the reduction of $10,000 was not generous, they were not outside the appropriate range. The costs award was also in range. The overall packet of sanctions was not manifestly excessive. The appeal against sentence is also dismissed.