High Court Judgments of Public Interest

Sentencing for Kaixiao Liu and Lanyue Xiao in respect of offending connected with the death of Shulai Wang.

Mr Liu given a starting point of 11 years' imprisonment for kidnapping/manslaughter charges and an 18 month uplift for the attempting to pervert justice and misconduct with human remains charges. Ms Xiao given a starting point of eight years, six months' imprisonment for the kidnapping/manslaughter charges and a 15 month uplift for the attempting to pervert justice and misconduct with human remains charges.

Defendants each given a five per cent discount for impact on children, five per cent discount for good character and 10 month reduction for time spent on EM bail.

Murder sentencing; s 104 engaged due to post-mortem desecration of the body.

Held: 17 year minimum period of imprisonment not manifestly unjust; sentenced to life imprisonment with 17 year minimum period of imprisonment.

Sentencing of D for one charge of attempted murder of her three-year-old son. Offending involved the infliction of several wounds to the victim's neck with a meat cleaver.

Result: Offending falls within Band 3 of Taueki, providing a starting point range between nine and 14 years. Aggravating factors include premeditation (to a modest degree); use of a weapon; severity of injuries; attack to the neck (synonymous with attack to the head); breach of trust; and victim vulnerability. Notional starting point of 10 years, six months' imprisonment. Starting point reduced by 24 per cent to eight years' imprisonment to acknowledge that Ms D was of substantially diminished culpability due to suffering an acute psychological crisis at the time of the offending. 15 per cent discount for guilty plea. 10 per cent discount for good character. No discount for remorse given Ms D continues to minimise aspects of the offending. No discount for background or rehabilitative efforts. 11 month discount for time spent on EM bail. End sentence of five years and one month's imprisonment.

Application for permanent name suppression refused. The identified hardships fall below the required standards for name suppression. Public interest in reporting serious offending of this nature.

Verdicts following Judge-alone trial of two defendants each facing one charge of wilfully attempting to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  Both defendants found not guilty.  Reasons provided in a separate judgment. 

Ms Tauroa was sentenced in the District Court to two years and eight months' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for two years following a guilty plea to one charge of dangerous driving causing death.  The victim was her 10-year-old stepbrother.  Ms Tauroa was 23 years old at the time of the offending.  Ms Tauroa appealed against that sentence on the basis that more than a 40 per cent reduction for various mitigating factors should have been allowed, although that was all that was asked for at the time of sentencing.

Held: appeal allowed in part.  The Court held that applying the 40 per cent cap under s 9Q of the Sentencing Act 2002 would result in manifest injustice under s 9R.  A reduction of 45 per cent, and at most 47.5 per cent, was the least extent necessary to avoid manifest injustice.  This reflect Ms T's youth, otherwise good character as a true first offender, community support (which wasn't explicitly allowed for), together with her guilty plea, remorse and capacity for rehabilitation, together with the profound trauma arising from the death of her young stepbrother and the lifelong consequences of the offending (which had been allowed for).  The sentence of two years and eight months' imprisonment was quashed and replaced with two years and four months' imprisonment.  The two-year driving disqualification remained. 

Applications to place the defendants, Byerley Park Ltd (BPL) and Karaka Estate Ltd (KEL), into liquidation. The defendants are corporate trustees of the Berley Park Trust (BPT) and Karaka Estate Trust (KET) respectively. Plaintiff makes the application in her capacity as director of both companies pursuant to s 241 of the Companies Act 1994 on the grounds that it is just and equitable as the boards of both companies are deadlocked due to an irretrievable breakdown in trust and confidence between the directors and shareholders; and the companies are insolvent. 

Held: Application granted. There has been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationships of the boards with respect to both BPL and KEL; and both BPL and KEL are insolvent, both on a balance sheet basis and because, without substantial external support, neither of the defendant companies are able to pay their debts as they fall due. A proposal to pay ongoing operational expenses through a receiver declined on the basis that it would permit BPL and KEL to continue trading without addressing their underlying insolvency and without guaranteeing the underlying assets of both trusts would not be put at a greater risk if they were no longer able to receive substantial external support. In addition, a receivership would not be neutral but would perpetrate the applicant's exclusion from management of the defendants and materially strengthen the co directors' position. Overall just and equitable for defendants to be placed in liquidation. Orders accordingly.

The first and second plaintiffs’ claim against the third and fourth defendants is dismissed. The third defendant’s counterclaim against the first plaintiff is dismissed.

HELD: The first and second defendants were founders, directors and shareholders of the first plaintiff, a nappy company. In early 2020, the first and second defendants were bought out of their shares in the first plaintiff. The sale and purchase agreement included a restraint of trade for the first and second defendants, beginning when their resignations as directors took effect.

While the first and second defendants were not practically involved in the business from 1 May 2020, they remained directors until 3 August 2020. Beginning in July 2020 and continuing throughout the year, the first defendant gave regular but informal advice to the directors of the third defendant, a company in the process of purchasing the struggling but well-known nappy brand, Treasures. The third defendant ultimately had Treasures nappies stocked in Countdown. The first defendant had no financial stake. The plaintiff claimed that the first defendant had breached his directors’ duties and restraint of trade. The first defendant settled prior to trial. The claim against the third defendant was for its role in causing the first defendant’s breaches. The fourth defendant is a company that holds some of the relevant assets.

The following factual findings were significant. The first defendant only gave a very limited amount of confidential information to the third defendant. The directors of the third defendant did not know and were not wilfully blind to: some of the information being confidential; and the first defendant continuing to be a director. While the plaintiff had an interest in acquiring the Treasures brand, this was not a firm plan and, in any event, the third defendant was unaware of it. The Court accepted that the first defendant continued to owe statutory and fiduciary duties until his resignation took effect on 3 August 2020, as well as further obligations of confidence and not to exploit the plaintiff’s corporate opportunities for his own gain.

The claim in breach of confidence against the third and fourth defendants failed due to: the very limited amount of confidential information shared; the lack of knowledge of or wilful blindness to it being confidential; the limited use of the information; and the lack of use to the first plaintiff’s detriment. The claim in dishonest assistance failed as the third defendant had not dishonestly assisted in the breach of duties by the first defendant.

The claim of knowing procurement of breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties required the recognition of a novel tort, which was not considered necessary on the facts. If available, it would have failed due to the third defendant’s lack of knowledge or wilful blindness to breaches.

The claim in unlawful conspiracy relied on the use of unlawful means. As none of the causes of action had been proven, no unlawful means were found. Further elements were not met: there was no intention to harm the first plaintiff; and damage had not occurred.

The claim in constructive trust against the fourth defendant failed as it relied on causes of action against the third defendant which were not proven. The Court noted that, even if liability had been made out, the plaintiffs had been unable to prove that the actions of the third defendant caused loss.

The counterclaim was filed by the third defendant after a representative of the first plaintiff told Countdown, who was stocking the third defendant’s nappies, that the third defendant had acted unlawfully. The counterclaim for misleading conduct failed due to a three-year limitation provision. But for the limitation provision, the Court considered that the claim would have been made out. The counterclaim for injurious falsehood was not made out due to the lack of malice, as the representative genuinely believed his statements to be true.

Application for declaration that Gangs Act 2024, s 7 (provision), which prohibits display of gang insignia in public places, is inconsistent with right to freedom of expression under s 14 of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

Held, provision limits right to freedom of expression, noting that expressive activity, including contentious or provocative activity, may be protected as speech (Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA); Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30).

No rights-consistent meaning advanced by defendant.

Held, limitation on right to freedom of expression imposed by provision had not been justified under s 5 of Bill of Rights. Gangs Act’s stated objective (to reduce ability of gangs to operate and cause fear, intimidation and disruption to public) a sufficiently important objective to justify some limitation on freedoms of gang members. Limitation rationally connected with its objective. However, objective could have been achieved by more limited ban; limit not proportionate to aim sought to be achieved.

Having found s 7 to be an unjustified limitation, Court addressed whether to exercise discretion to make declaration of inconsistency. Supreme Court decisions in AG v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104, Make It 16 Inc v AG [2022] NZSC 134 and AG v Chisnall [2024] NZSC 178 considered.

Held, declaration would serve public remedial purpose and have utility for plaintiff without undermining his conviction.

Held, comity/deference did not require Court to decline to make declaration. Deference inherent in fact that Court’s power is declaratory only; not appropriate for courts to act strategically by anticipating political reaction to a declaration. Court relied on Supreme Court judgments in Taylor and Chisnall in which Court said that in making a declaration the court was fulfilling its obligation to grant remedies for breaches of the Bill of Rights Act and was exercising its judicial function.

Attorney-General’s report to Parliament under s 7 of Bill of Rights did not militate against declaration; s 7 report and declarations serve different purposes.

Declaration made that s 7 of Gangs Act inconsistent with right in s 14 of Bill of Rights and that this has not been justified under s 5 of Bill of Rights.

Associated application for declaration that provision also inconsistent with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declined for lack of jurisdiction.

Sentencing. Mr Tasker is for sentence on the murder of a police officer, causing grievous bodily harm to another police officer; driving dangerously causing injury (x2), and dangerous driving, driving with excess blood alcohol, and driving while disqualified.

Result: On the charge of murder, Mr Tasker is sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 22 years and disqualified from driving for three years; for intentionally causing grievous bodily harm, eight years' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for three years; for driving dangerously and causing injury, two years' imprisonment and two years' disqualification on each charge; for dangerous driving, driving with excess blood alcohol and disqualified driving, three months imprisonment and disqualification from driving for three years. All sentences are to be served concurrently. Destruction of the motor vehicle ordered under s 142R of the Sentencing Act.

Sentencing of Mr Dwight Fatu for serious methamphetamine charges and participating in an organised criminal group. Mr Fatu pleaded guilty to the offending four years after the charges were made and subsequent to a Court of Appeal decision holding that evidence taken from the AN0M devices used to facilitate the offending was admissible.

Sentencing comprised of an 11-year starting point, one year uplift for other offending, one year uplift for previous convictions, 15 percent discount for background, and 15 percent discount for guilty plea. No reductions granted for delay as not undue or behaviour of the FBI. This produced an end sentence of nine years and five months' imprisonment.

Sentencing for three charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, injuring with intent to injure and threatening to kill. Offending committed in 2003, originally receiving a sentence of preventive detention. In 2025, the Court of Appeal quashed the sentence. Sentence of seven and a half years' imprisonment imposed.

The defendant sentenced after pleading guilty to murder. Court satisfied life sentence would not be manifestly unjust under s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002. A life sentence is required in the interests of public safety. The Court considered the application of R v Van Hemert [2023] NZSC 116, [2023] 1 NZLR 412.

Starting point for minimum period of imprisonment 11 years. Reductions available for guilty plea and impact of mental health issues on culpability. End sentence of life imprisonment with a 10-year minimum period of imprisonment.

Sentencing for one charge of (vehicular) manslaughter and one charge of reckless driving causing injury.

Held: starting point of five years and nine months' imprisonment having regard to aggravating factors, consumption of alcohol (estimated level of 189 micrograms of alcohol over 100 milliliters of blood), driving in breach of zero alcohol limit; disregarding available alternatives; excessive speed (over 113 km on a 75 km advised corner); driving while distracted; injury to second victim.

20 per cent deduction for guilty plea.
15 per cent deduction for youth (including clear driving record). 20 per cent deduction for rehabilitation and remorse.
End sentence of two years and seven months' imprisonment on manslaughter charge. Sentence of one year's imprisonment on second charge.
Sentence is to be served concurrently. Disqualification from driving for two and a half years. Ordered to pay blood analysis costs.

Stormy Ryder sentenced to manslaughter of her 19-month-old, whose direct cause of death was complications from starvation and dehydration. Ms Ryder pleaded guilty to the charge at the beginning of her jury trial after acceptance of a sentence indication in April 2026. After rejecting a request by the defence to revisit the starting point as a result of matters raised in a psychological report, a sentence of three years and five months’ imprisonment was imposed. This sentence comprised of a starting point of six years and three months’ imprisonment and several personal mitigating factors, including 25 per cent for personal background and addiction issues; five per cent for remorse; five per cent for prospects of rehabilitation; and 10 per cent for her guilty plea.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s 7(3) of the Gangs Act 2024, which provides that gang insignia unlawfully displayed in a public place is forfeited to the Crown upon a guilty plea or conviction and may thereafter be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as directed by the court. Mr Gray-Gill pleaded guilty to displaying Black Power gang insignia in a public place. Following conviction and discharge, the District Court recorded that the insignia was forfeited to the Crown but directed that it was not to be destroyed, and had earlier indicated that it could be returned to Mr Gray-Gill. The Solicitor-General appealed, arguing that once forfeited, the insignia could not lawfully be returned and that a direction merely prohibiting destruction was not available under s 7(3)(b).

Held: Appeal allowed. Consistent with the Court's reasoning in Solicitor-General v Leef, forfeiture under s 7(3)(a) is automatic, absolute, and irreversible. Once gang insignia is forfeited to the Crown, it cannot be returned to the defendant. Section 7(3)(b) requires the court to direct either destruction or another lawful form of disposal, but a direction that the insignia simply "not be destroyed" is not contemplated by the statutory scheme. The District Court's directions were quashed, except for the forfeiture order, and the matter was remitted to the District Court to determine the police application for destruction or another lawful form of disposal, excluding return of the insignia to Mr Gray-Gill.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s 7(3) of the Gangs Act 2024, which provides that gang insignia displayed unlawfully in a public place is forfeited to the Crown upon a guilty plea or conviction and may thereafter be "destroyed or otherwise disposed of' as directed by the court. The respondent, Mr Leef, a patched member of the Mongrel Mob, pleaded guilty to displaying gang insignia in a public place. Following conviction, his gang patch was forfeited to the Crown. The District Court subsequently directed that the patch be returned to Mr Leef after he undertook not to wear it again in public, holding that the phrase "otherwise disposed of' in s 7(3)(b) was broad enough to encompass return of the patch to its former owner. The Solicitor-General appealed, contending that, after forfeiture under s 7(3)(a), the statutory power to direct destruction or other disposal (under s 7(3)(b) does not include returning the forfeited item to the person from whom it was seized.

Held: appeal allowed. Applying orthodox principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held that forfeiture to the Crown under s 7(3)(a) is absolute and irretrievable. Once forfeited, the insignia remains in the Crown possession pending an application to the court for its destruction or other permanent disposal. The phrase "otherwise disposed of' does not extend to returning the insignia to the defendant, as such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the forfeiture and the statutory scheme as a whole. The Court also held that the effect of the subsection is to override the right to personal property. Similarly, the Court held that it is not possible to find a tenable meaning that is consistent, or less inconsistent, with the rights affirmed in NZBORA. Accordingly, the Court concluded that s 7(3) does not permit the return of forfeited gang insignia to a defendant. The matter was remitted to the District Court for an order directing destruction of the insignia or another lawful form of disposal, excluding its return to Mr Leef.

Defendant sentenced after pleading guilty to manslaughter and conspiring to pervert the course of justice. At a tangi, the defendant punched the victim in the head once, then pursued him. He punched him once more and stomped on his head twice. The victim subsequently died from injuries caused by one of the two punches.

Held: Starting point of eight years for manslaughter charge, uplifted by nine months for conspiring to pervert the course of justice for overall starting point of eight years nine months' imprisonment. End sentence of seven years' imprisonment after reductions for guilty plea and youth. Minimum period of imprisonment of half the total sentence imposed.  

Cumulative sentence of six years’ imprisonment imposed for three charges of rape, one charge of attempted sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection and one charge of assault on a person in a family relationship (Crimes Act 1961, ss 128(1)(a), 128B, 129 and 194A). Sentence reflected a significant totality adjustment from an end sentence of 11 years and three months to reflect the sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment that the offender was already serving for unrelated sexual offending. This led to a total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment. No minimum period of imprisonment was imposed and nor was preventive detention, in light of the offender’s lack of rehabilitation opportunities to date and the option for an extended supervision order at the end of an already lengthy finite sentence.

Sentencing for two charges of drugged driving causing injury and one of drugged driving causing death.

Held:

1. Starting point of 5.5 years warranted in light of aggravating features which included high THC concentration paired with alcohol, poor driving over a considerable period, known poor condition of vehicle, licence suspended at the time, on bail for driving while suspended at the time.

2. No adjustment for relevant but somewhat dated previous offending.

3. 10 per cent reduction for remorse and limited rehabilitation prospects.

4. 20 per cent reduction for guilty plea following "on the record" offer to plead to charge eventually filed by amendment.

5. Four-month reduction for 10 months spent on EM bail.

6. No reparation order made - no prospect of it being paid.

7. Outstanding fines remitted in light of prison sentence imposed.

8 .Sentences for three charges to be served concurrently. End sentence 3.5 years. Disqualification from driving for 4 years.