Court of Appeal Judgments of Public Interest

Appeal - Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 - Land Transfer Act 1952 - Maori Land Court - jurisdiction -
statutory interpretation- customary rights - indefeasibility - decision

From 2002 to 2009, certificates of title in respect of parts of the bed of the Waikato River (the River Bed) were issued to the Crown. The titles are now held by Mercury NZ Ltd (Mercury), or the Crown for the benefitof Mercury. Twelve hapū and the Pouākani Claims Trust No 2 (together, the Pouākani claimants) claim tikanga rights, interests and responsibilities in relation to specified areas of the River Bed, its waters and adjacent lands. In 2019, they filed a claim in the Māori Land Court.

The Pouākani claimants' claim:
(a) the River Bed land is Māori customary land and therefore is or should be vested in the Pouākani claimants (the customary land claim);
(b) the Crown holds title to the River Bed as a fiduciary for the true customary Māori owners, the Pouākani claimants (the fiduciary duty claim); and
(c) the Pouākani claimants own the river water flowing over the River Bed, and the Māori Land Court can issue a declaration to that effect (the water claim).

Mercury applied to strike out that claim. The Māori Land Court declined the strike-out application. Mercury applied to the High Court for judicial review of that decision. The High Court determined that the Māori Land Court has no jurisdiction to inquire into fiduciary duty claims to General land or Crown land and no jurisdiction to make declarations about the ownership of water, but allowed the Māori Land Court to consider the customary land claim. The Pouākani claimants appeal and cross-appeal the decisions about jurisdiction regarding the water and fiduciary duty claims. Mercury and the Attorney-General appeal the decision about the customary land claim.

Issue 1: Does the Māori Land Court have jurisdiction to consider the water claim?
Held: no. The position in te ao Māori that water is inherently interconnected with land does not support the Māori Land Court having jurisdiction to consider a claim relating only to water under the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 (the Act), where there is no land with any legal status on which to ground the claim within the Act. The text, context, and purpose of the Act, including its interpretation in light of tikanga, and the case authorities, are not consistent with the Māori Land Court having jurisdiction under the Act to determine claims to water irrespective and independently of the status of associated land. The water claim may be considered by the High Court.

Issue 2: Does the Māori Land Court have jurisdiction to consider the fiduciary duty claim?
Held: no. This Court is ordinarily bound by its own decisions. We do not consider the conditions here justify departure from the unanimous judgment of a full court of this Court in Attorney-General v Māori Land Court, which held that s 18(1)(i) of the Act does not extend to jurisdiction to hear fiduciary claims to General land or Crown land. The fiduciary duty claim may also be considered by the High Court.

Issue 3: Is the customary land claim untenable?
Held: Yes. On the basis of the text of the Act, considered in the context of case law before and since, and its legislative history, it is crystal clear that Parliament did not intend to create Māori customary land as an exception to indefeasibility under the LTA regime. Case law in respect of the clash between earlier versions of the LTA and earlier versions of the Act whereby Māori customary land was registered without going through the Act's processes was resolved in favour of the LTA. All case law since points in the same direction - that customary title or rights are not an exception to the indefeasibility of registered title. Nor is there any express statement in the Act nor material indication in its legislative history that in passing the Act, Parliament intended to change the relationship between the LTA regime and the Māori land law regime.

Criminal law — Sentence appeal — Murder — Minimum period of imprisonment

The appeal is allowed. The minimum period of imprisonment of 12 years is set aside and replaced with a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years.

Mr Salt was found guilty by jury of the murder of Tofimua Matagi. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 12 years. He appeals his MPI on the basis it is manifestly excessive, as the starting point was too high and insufficient weight was placed on his personal mitigating factors.


Is the MPI of 12 years manifestly excessive? Held: Yes.

The starting point of 12 and a half years was manifestly excessive when compared with other similar cases and considering the aggravating factors of the offending. The Judge’s approach to discounts for personal mitigating factors was correct.

Appeal — Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 — interim orders — decision

Appeal dismissed.

On 17 November 2025, on the advice of the Minister of Health (the Minister), the Medicines (Restriction on Prescribing Gonadotropin-releasing Hormone Analogues) Amendment Regulations 2025 (the Regulations) were made by Order in Council.  Their effect is to ban new prescriptions for gonadotropin-releasing hormone analogues, commonly known as “puberty blockers”, to treat gender dysphoria or gender incongruence in children or adolescents.  The Professional Association for Transgender Health Aotearoa Incorporated (PATHA) challenges the validity of the Regulations in the High Court.  PATHA also sought interim orders directing the Minister to take all necessary steps to suspend the Regulations pending further order of the Court.  The High Court declined that application but declared that the Crown should take no steps to enforce the Regulations pending determination of the application for judicial review.  PATHA appeals that decision.

Issue: Is the relief ordered by the High Court ineffective to preserve PATHA’s position?  

Held: No.  It would be extraordinary for any public body to facilitate a complaint about the prescription of puberty blockers as unethical because it is illegal, when doing so would disregard the intent of an order of the High Court which has, in effect, suspended the enforcement of the Regulations.  The same applies to private prosecution.  Any other view would be an unduly narrow and technical interpretation of the rule of law.