MI (CA426/2025) v R - [2025] NZCA 558

Motor manslaughter - Appeal against sentence 

The appeal is dismissed. 

The appellant participated in an illegal "boy racer" event. He hit a young woman who was pregnant and who was a spectator at the event. She was injured and her baby died shortly after the event following an emergency caesarean section. The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted of manslaughter, dangerous driving causing injury and driving while disqualified. He was sentenced to two years and four months' imprisonment. 

He appeals his sentence on the basis that the starting point of four years and three months' imprisonment was too high, a 25 per cent reduction to his sentence should have been allowed for his guilty plea (rather than the 20 per cent given), and a further 25 to 30 per cent reduction should have been made for his youth, background and intellectual deficiencies (rather than the 15 per cent given). 

Was the starting point too high? No.
A starting point of four years' imprisonment was available to the Judge before consideration of the fact that the appellant was a disqualified driver in a vehicle that was not roadworthy and had previous driving offences. The Judge's addition of three months for those matters tempered the uplift she would have otherwise given for personal aggravating factors to avoid double counting. 

Should a greater allowance have been made for the appellant's guilty plea? No.
There were unusual circumstances that properly explained the delay in entering a guilty plea to the manslaughter charge as the Judge accepted. The Judge did not allow the maximum 25 per cent reduction available for a guilty plea because the appellant did not accept responsibility for the charge of dangerous driving causing injury to N at an early time. That charge was reasonably straightforward, did not require expert evidence and was brought six months before the manslaughter charge. While some Judges might have allowed the full 25 per cent reduction to take into account the appellant's communication difficulties (and counsel's concern not to obtain instructions until a communication assistant was appointed), it was open to the Judge to allow a 20 per cent reduction evaluating all the circumstances of the plea, and doing so did not lead to an end sentence that was manifestly excessive. 

Should a greater allowance have been made for youth, background and intellectual deficiencies? No.
The Judge was correct to consider these factors together. There was also a degree of overlap between these factors and the 10 per cent reduction to the sentence allowed for the appellant's rehabilitative efforts, which was arguably generous.